Related Posts
Subscribe via Email
Subscribe to our blog to get insights sent directly to your inbox.
Last Updated: October 16, 2025
F5 disclosed a “highly sophisticated” intrusion by a nation-state actor. The attacker maintained long-term access to F5’s BIG-IP product development environment and engineering knowledge systems and exfiltrated files that include portions of BIG-IP source code and information about undisclosed vulnerabilities under remediation. F5 says it has no evidence of supply-chain tampering, no signs of critical/RCE zero-days, and no new unauthorized activity since containment. Some exfiltrated internal docs included configuration/implementation details for a small percentage of customers, who will be notified directly. Disclosure was delayed with DOJ authorization under SEC 8-K Item 1.05(c).
BIG-IP (LTM, ASM/Advanced WAF, APM, GTM/DNS, etc.) sits in front of citizen-facing apps and identity flows across state, local, higher-ed, and federal networks. Theft of source code and knowledge of not-yet-public bugs increases the risk of rapid exploit development and targeted reconnaissance against agencies running out-of-date images or exposed management planes. Even without supply-chain tampering, adversaries can use configuration details and engineering docs to speed up exploitation paths that already align with historic BIG-IP tradecraft (iControl REST abuse, mgmt-plane exposure, auth bypass chains).
On October 15, 2025, CISA issued Emergency Directive 26-01 directing federal civilian agencies to immediately inventory all F5 BIG-IP/BIG-IQ/F5OS and downloaded software, remove any public management-plane exposure, apply F5’s October security updates on an accelerated schedule (most products by Oct 22, remaining by Oct 31), and disconnect unsupported/EoL devices—with reporting due Oct 29 (summary) and a full inventory by Dec 3. CISA characterizes the risk as significant in light of F5’s breach and urges rapid hardening and patching; even non-federal orgs should mirror these steps and timelines.
A nation-state actor had long-term access to F5’s BIG-IP development environment and stole files that include portions of source code and information about not-yet-public vulnerabilities. Independent reviews say there’s no evidence of supply-chain tampering or active exploitation of undisclosed RCEs, but the theft meaningfully raises exploit risk for lagging or misconfigured deployments.
For help applying these lessons across your environment, reach out to the NuHarbor team.
Don't miss another article. Subscribe to our blog now.
Justin (he/him) is the founder and CEO of NuHarbor Security, where he continues to advance modern integrated cybersecurity services. He has over 20 years of cybersecurity experience, much of it earned while leading security efforts for multinational corporations, most recently serving as global CISO at Keurig Green Mountain Coffee. Justin serves multiple local organizations in the public interest, including his board membership at Champlain College.
Subscribe to our blog to get insights sent directly to your inbox.